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Abstract
	 In	the	field	of	political	science,	new	institutionalism	has	been	widely	recognized	as	a	key	theoretical	
insight	 for	 explaining	preference	 formation,	 actors’	 strategic	action,	 and	political	outcomes.	The	
institutionalist	 approach	 has	 often	 been	 divided	 into	 sub-disciplines	 such	 as	 rational-choice	
institutionalism,	historical	 institutionalism,	and	sociological	 institutionalism.	This	paper	presents	how	
these	three	approaches	differ	and	what	each	school	of	thought	implies	for	the	maintenance	or	disruption	of	
the	social	status	quo,	such	as	structured	social	disparities.
Keywords : rational	choice	theory,	historical	institutionalism,	sociological	institutionalism,	deliberative	
perspective,	structured	inequality
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Introduction
	 What	do	rational-choice,	historical-sociological,	and	deliberative	 institutionalist	approaches	 imply	for	
“structured	inequality,”	by	which	I	mean	the	historically	and	socially	constructed	patterns	of	differences	in	
life-chances?	This	paper	contributes	to	the	argument	about	social	inequalities	from	the	perspectives	of	new	
institutionalism	and	deliberation.	The	 first	and	second	sections	describe	 rational-choice	and	historical-
sociological	institutionalisms	and	explore	the	implications	of	each	institutionalist	school	in	regards	to	their	
impact	on	social	inequalities.	The	third	section	introduces	a	deliberative	account	of	politics	by	providing	an	
empirical	example	of	the	deliberative	model	for	institutions	(“the	Deliberative	Polling”).	This	paper	argues,	
that	although	historical-sociological	 institutionalism,	which	does	not	assume	that	preferences	are	fixed	or	
already	given,	has	advantages	over	rational-choice	 institutionalism	when	it	comes	 to	 the	rectification	of	
inequalities,	historical-sociological	models	fail	to	provide	political	actors	with	opportunities	to	autonomously	
modify	or	 change	any	existing	unequal	 status	quo,	 and	 the	 static	 and	deterministic	nature	of	 former	
institutionalisms	can	be	complemented	by	deliberative	exchanges	of	preferences	among	agents.
1.	 Rational-Choice	Institutionalism	and	Inequality
	 Broadly	stated,	new	institutionalism	is	divided	into	two	distinctive	schools:	rational-choice	institutionalism	
and	historical-sociological	institutionalism.	These	two	approaches	basically	agree	that	institutions	are,	in	the	
broad	sense,	the	rules	of	the	game	that	structure	human	behavior	and	interaction	(North	1990).	However,	they	
disagree	on	how	institutions	are	(i)	created,	(ii)	utilized,	and	(iii)	ultimately	restructured.	In	this	section,	I	first	
provide	a	brief	sketch	of	rational-choice	institutionalist	approach	and	then	demonstrate	how	this	school	carries	
implications	for	inequalities.
1.1.	Rational-choice	perspective
	 Rational-choice	institutionalism	is	the	term	for	the	belief	that	institutions	are	created	by	rational	and	self-
interested	individuals	who	behave	instrumentally	to	maximize	their	political	preferences	that	are	assumed	
fixed	and	constrained	by	institutional	structures	(i.e.,	macro-structural	variables).	Institutional	structures	are	
set	up	or	recreated	in	a	way	that	individuals	can	pursue	their	personal	preferences	with	a	complete	knowledge	
of	 the	details	of	a	given	situation.	Douglass	North	 (1990)	noted	 that	 transactions	between	 individuals,	
including	political	and	economic	exchanges,	are	costly,	and	that	such	transaction costs arise	from	acquiring	
information	(i.e.,	measuring	the	attributes	of	goods	and	services)	and	from	enforcing	exchanges	and	policing	
contracts.	He	argued	that	institutions	are	the	constraints	that	structure	human	behavior,	by	which	uncertainty	is	
reduced	and	human	interactions	are	facilitated.	Accordingly,	institutions	are	selected	by	ex ante bargaining	and	
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negotiations	under	uncertainties	and	contingencies	about	the	state	of	the	world	(e.g.,	preferences	of	others)	
and	are	maintained	over	a	period	of	 time	by	reaching	a	structure-induced equilibrium,	at	which	no	player	
wishes	to	change	the	institutional	arrangement	(Shepsle	1989).
	 Once	institutions	are	in	place,	all	political	actors	utilize	the	institutional	framework	to	strategically	pursue	
their	idiosyncratic	goals	and	values	under	certain	rules	or	within	a	matrix	of	sanctions	and	incentives	(Elster	
1989).	Politics	is	a	“struggle	for	power,”	and	political	outcomes	are	produced	by	a	series	of	collective	action	
dilemmas	and	strategic	interactions	(Hall	and	Taylor	1996).	Rational-choice	institutionalists	posit	that	rational	
actors	behave	within	particular	 institutional	settings	(i.e.,	 the	 rules)	and	desire	 to	attain	 their	objectives	
according	to	their	own	political	preferences.	In	this	sense,	 they	assume	that	preferences	of	political	actors	
exist	 prior	 to	 institutions.	Based	on	 such	deductive	 and	universalistic	 assumptions,	 rational-choice	
institutionalism	believes	that	we	can	understand	and	predict	possible	political	outcomes	by	analyzing	the	“law	
of	human	action.”	The	main	focus	of	rational-choice	theories	 is	always	individual	actors	 themselves,	and	
institutions	play	only	a	complementary	role	in	the	process	of	utility	maximization.	In	this	respect,	rational-
choice	approaches	are	highly	functionalist	and	tend	to	explain	an	institution	in	terms	of	its	effectiveness.	This	
is	why	they	argue	that	the	absence	of	functional	institutions	leads	to	collective	action	problems	such	as	the	
Prisoner’s	Dilemma	and	the	Tragedy	of	the	Commons	(Ostrom	1990,	1998).
	 For	rational-choice	institutionalists,	 institutional	change	occurs	as	a	consequence	of	preference	strategies	
that	powerful	actors	employ	to	attain	their	goals	in	a	more	efficient	and	beneficial	way.	Institutions	change	
when	it	 is	efficient	for	strategic	actors	 to	modify	the	rules	and	make	new	cost-benefit	calculations.	Since	
transaction	costs	(i.e.,	the	costs	of	measuring	the	quality	of	goods	and	the	costs	of	enforcing	contracts	through	
legal,	judicial,	and	ethical	means)	make	institutions	less	efficient	and	effective	(North	1981),	and,	thus,	less	
functional	 institutions	are	restructured	to	reduce	transaction	costs	and	uncertainty.	This	 implies	 that,	once	
stabilized,	 it	 is	very	difficult	 to	change	the	 institution	because	changing	the	rules	produces	unpredictable	
uncertainty	about	its	outcome.
1.2.	Implications	for	inequalities
	 Rational-choice	approaches	have	notable	advantages.	Firstly,	since	the	political	process	is	entirely	reduced	
to	a	strategic	political	competition	between	self-interested	individuals	who	pursue	utility	maximization,	 in	
principle,	political	actors	can	easily	make	definite	decisions	easily	by	calculating	what	would	maximize	the	
total	utility	of	all	agents	through	a	decision-making	process,	even	if	there	is	a	reasonable	disagreement	among	
agents	 (Gutmann	and	Thompson	2004).	Secondly,	 in	 rational-choice	 institutionalism	 that	assumes	 that	
preferences	are	fixed	and	already	determined,	political	actors	can	ensure	that	political	decisions	and	outcomes	
directly reflect	the	sum	of	their	personal	preferences	or	the	“the	greatest	happiness	of	the	largest	number,”	
without	any	procedural	“interferences,”	such	as	democratic	deliberation	and	moral	judgment	(Gutmann	and	
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Thompson	2004).
	 Nevertheless,	 the	rational-choice	model	 is	seriously	flawed	when	it	comes	 to	 the	adjustment	of	social	
inequalities.	First,	strategic	power	games	among	self-interested	individuals	may	exclude	all	political	actors	
except	the	powerful	few,	resulting	in	the	reproduction	of	the	existing	power	structures	in	the	society.	This	is	
because	political	minorities	cannot	but	obey	the	aggregation	of	fixed	preferences	of	powerful	players.	Since	
political	outcomes	are	produced	from	a	mere	calculation	of	 individual	desires	or	a	simple	aggregation	of	
subjective	wills,	 there	is	little	room	for	marginalized	groups	to	challenge	or	change	the	unequal	status	quo.	
For	example,	suppose	there	is	a	society	in	which	there	are	100	political	actors,	80	of	whom	prefer	“Utility	A”	
to	“Utility	B”	(U
A
	>	U
B
)	and	20	prefer	“Utility	B”	 to	“Utility	A”	(U
B
	>	U
A
)	and	 that	 for	80	people	(the	
majority),	choosing	U
B
	undermines	their	first	preference,	U
A
.	In	this	society,	every	individual	pursues	the	
maximization	of	his	own	personal	 interest	and	there	is	no	opportunity	or	 incentive	for	each	to	change	his	
preference	structure	(i.e.,	preference	order)	or	to	behave	altruistically	or	reciprocally.	Since	political	outcomes	
of	 this	society	are	determined	by	an	aggregation	of	fixed	100	preferences,	U
A
,	which	is	supported	by	the	
majority,	is	always	regarded	as	“the	will	of	the	people,”	and	U
B
	is	destined	for	perpetual	marginalization.
	 Second,	rational-choice	institutionalists	 implicitly	exclude	the	possibility	that	human	beings	cease	to	be	
egoists	or	utility	maximizers.	For	example,	Amartya	Sen	(1990)	criticizes	the	behavioral	basis	of	rational-
choice	theories,	the	zero-sum	nature	of	games	(i.e.,	a	Pareto	optimum),	egoistic	utilitarianism,	and	narrowly	
conceptualized	personal	preferences.	Sen	introduces	two	concepts:	(1)	sympathy─“the	[egoistic]	concern	for	
others	directly	affects	one’s	own	welfare”	(Sen	1990:	31)	and	(2)	commitment─the	altruistic	motivations	for	
having	others	better	off,	even	if	it	is	a	counter-preferential	choice.	He	argued	that,	for	the	economic	model	that	
focuses	on	an	individual’s	rational	behavior,	sympathy	could	be	considered	a	mere	“externality.”	However,	
commitment directly	challenges	the	economic	theory’s	essential	assumption	that	people	always	exert	efforts	to	
maximize	their	own	interests.	By	the	concept	of	commitment,	he	claimed	that	we	can	infuse	moral	and	ethical	
aspirations	into	the	traditional	economic	conception	of	rationality.
	 Considering	these,	the	rational-choice	model	is	highly	static	and	deterministic	in	nature	(Green	and	Shapiro	
1996)	and	does	not	have	an	inherent	mechanism	to	incentivize	inequality	reduction.
2.	Historical-Sociological	Institutionalism	and	Inequality
2.1.	Historical-sociological	perspective
	 Unlike	rational-choice	institutionalists,	who	argue	that	institutions	are	an	intervening	variable	that	affects	the	
actions	and	choices	of	rational	individuals,	historical-sociological	 institutionalists	perceive	the	relationship	
between	 institutions	and	human	behavior	more	broadly	and	consider	 that	contexts	shape	agent	actions.	
Essentially,	 the	rules	and	preference	structures	of	political	actors	are	 influenced	by	historical	and	social	
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contexts	within	which	institutions	are	structured	and	restructured.	For	historical	institutionalists,	institutions─
formal	rules,	structures,	codes,	and	organizational	norms─shape	 the	actions	and	choices	of	actors	whose	
rationality	 is	 limited	 or	 “bounded”	within	 a	 certain	 context.	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 for	 sociological	
institutionalists,	institutions	and	individuals	are	dependent	variables	defined	by	larger	environmental	factors,	
such	as	culture,	moral	 templates,	cognitive	scripts,	symbol	systems,	conventions,	and	customs	(Hall	and	
Taylor	1996;	Koelble	1995).
	 These	context-oriented	schools	consider	 that	human	behavior	 is	situated	 in	certain	historical	or	social	
conjunctures.	For	instance,	historical	institutionalists	argue	that	institutions	are	not	the	only	factor	that	causes	
political	outcomes,	emphasizing	contextual	elements	such	as	the	asymmetrical	distribution	of	power	across	
social	groups,	historical	trajectories	along	which	historical	development	takes	place	and	path-dependency	and	
unpredictability	of	political	outcomes	(Hall	and	Taylor	1996;	Koelble	1995;	Steinmo	et	al.	1992).	Sociological	
institutionalists,	on	 the	other	hand,	posit	 that	social	 ties	and	networks	construct	political	actions.	Mark	
Granovetter	(1985),	for	example,	argues	that	human	behavior	is	embedded	 in	the	structure	and	networks	of	
interpersonal	 social	 relationships.	Granovetter	 criticizes	 “undersocialized”	 economic	 theories	 that	
overemphasize	 the	maximization	of	 individuals’	self-interested	preferences,	pointing	out	 that	economic	
approaches	are	 implicitly	based	upon	 the	atomization	of	 the	 individual	and,	 thus,	 tend	 to	 ignore	social	
relationships	 in	which	political	actors	decide	 their	actions	and	attitudes.	 In	sociological	 institutionalism,	
rationality	and	preferences	are	subject	 to	the	“logic	of	social	appropriateness”	that	 informs	actors	whether	
their	actions	and	attitudes	are	socially	acceptable,	thereby	determining	the	possible	range	of	human	behavior	
(Campbell	2004;	March	and	Olsen	1989,	1998;	Powell	and	DiMaggio	1991).
	 From	historical-sociological	perspectives,	institutional	change	comes	from	exogenous	factors	rather	than	
from	an	inherent	function	of	individual	preferences	and	strategies.	Unlike	rational-choice	institutionalists	who	
believe	 that	an	 individual’s	pursuit	of	personal	preferences	produces	radical	and	 incremental	changes	 in	
institutions	 (Cammack	1992),	historical	 institutionalists	believe	 that	 institutional	change	stems	from	an	
agent’s	logical	and	strategic	choices	in	a	path-dependent	environment	(Hay	and	Wincott	1998;	Peters	et	al.	
2005).	In	essence,	they	believe	that,	from	a	“critical	juncture”	or	a	“bifurcation	point,”	meaning	a	period	of	
significant	change	that	shifts	 the	 trajectories	of	policy	development	at	any	given	point	of	 time,	produces	
pressure	for	policy	changes	(Collier	and	Collier	1991;	Pierson	2000).	Similarly,	sociological	institutionalists	
argue	 that	 institutions	can	persist	over	a	period	of	 time	even	 if	existing	 institutional	arrangements	are	
dysfunctional,	 inefficient,	or	hinder	utilitarian	reasoning	(Cammack	1992).	Sociological	 institutionalism	
argues	 that	 institutions	develop	or	change	according	 to	what	 is	socially	 legitimate	or	appropriate	 to	 the	
political	actors	within	a	certain	socially	constructed	institutional	setting	(Hall	and	Taylor	1996;	March	and	
Olsen	1989,	1998;	Powell	and	DiMaggio	1991).	Thus,	for	sociological	 institutionalists,	 institutional	shift	
comes	from	a	change	in	informal	rules,	such	as	norms,	ideas,	roles,	scripts,	and	culture,	which	are	embedded	
国際公共政策研究  第17巻第 1 号128
in	a	context	of	the	long-standing	social	environment.
2.2.	Implications	for	inequalities
	 Based	on	 these	points,	 the	question	arises	on	what	 are	 the	 implications	of	historical-sociological	
institutionalism	on	 social	 inequalities.	First,	 it	must	be	noted	 that	 these	approaches	are	 substantially	
distinguished	from	ration-choice	models	 in	 that	historical-sociological	 institutionalists	posit	 that	political	
actors’	interests,	goals,	and	choices	are	not	given	a priori,	but	are	rather	historically	contingent	or	socially	
constructed.	The	crucial	difference	 lies	 in	 the	understanding	of	political	actors’	preference	 formation.	
According	 to	rational-choice	 institutionalists,	preferences	are	 fixed	and	exogenous	 to	 institutions,	while	
historical-sociological	 institutionalists	posit	 that	preferences	are	structured	by institutions.	 In	historical-
sociological	institutionalism,	institutions	are	not	mere	reflections	of	fixed	preferences	of	powerful	actors,	but	
rather	a	set	of	structured	rules,	such	as	norms,	conventions,	 routines,	beliefs,	and	values.	 In	 this	 regard,	
historical-sociological	 institutionalism	provides	a	wider	and	 thicker	definition	of	 institutions	and	a	more	
flexible	and	dynamic	account	of	politics	than	rational-choice	models.	In	this	sense,	the	unequal	status	quo	in	a	
society	can	be	modified	by	changes	in	the	preference	structures	of	political	actors	or	external	changes	in	rules	
and	informal	institutions.	For	example,	we	might	be	able	to	expect	positive	changes	in	external	factors,	such	
as	 increased	awareness	of	social	 inequalities,	attitudinal	shifts	about	existing	disadvantages	 in	a	society,	
prevalence	of	altruistic	values	and	behaviors,	or	an	experience	of	historical	change	transforming	the	state	
itself	 into	a	“welfare-state.”	The	historical-sociological	understanding	of	 institutions	makes	 it	possible	 to	
incorporate	contextual	flexibility─historical	developments	or	social	structural	changes─which	can	become	the	
basis	for	restructuring	the	rationality	and	preferences	of	political	agents	and,	in	turn,	break	the	status	quo.
	 Yet,	these	context-oriented	institutionalist	approaches	are	still	somewhat	static	in	the	sense	that	they	posit	
that	human	behavior	and	political	outcomes	are,	in	principle,	path-dependent	or	socially	determined.	These	
models	have	difficulty	explaining	what	brings	the	turning	point	that	 initiates	changes	within	historical	and	
social	contexts	and	to	what	extent	historical	trajectories	and	social	norms	are	stationary	and	persistent	over	
time.	Historical-sociological	institutionalists	posit	that	changes	are	ultimately	contextual	and	dependent	upon	
external	factors	and	trends;	however,	this	macro-institutional	framework	cannot	explain	why	and	how	these	
external	changes	occur.
	 More	crucially,	macro-historical	processes	and	social	structures	or	networks	themselves	can	become	primary	
sources	of	inequalities.	For	example,	Charles	Tilly	(1998)	argues	that	durable	inequalities	among	people	(e.g.,	
black/white,	male/female,	and	citizen/foreigner)	are	caused	and	maintained	by	two	mechanisms:	exploitation	
and	opportunity hoarding.	Exploitation	occurs	when	powerful,	connected	people	dominate	resources	to	gain	
benefits	and	exclude	others	from	using	resources.	Opportunity hoarding	is	a	mechanism	in	which	members	of	
a	categorically	bounded	network	restrict	others’	access	to	resources	valuable	to	their	own	group.	The	influence	
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of	these	two	mechanisms	is	further	strengthened	by emulation	(i.e.,	 the	copying	of	existing	social	relations	
from	one	setting	to	another)	and adaptation	(i.e.,	the	formation	of	daily	practices─such	as	mutual	aid,	political	
influences,	and	information	gathering─that	are	based	on	social	structures	of	categorical	 inequality).	These	
processes,	he	concludes,	lead	to	a	hierarchical	differentiation	of	peoples	or,	in	his	word,	“social	stratification.”
	 Considering	these,	despite	the	fact	that	historical-sociological	institutionalism	has	certain	advantages	over	
rational-choice	theories	in	terms	of	the	correction	of	structured	inequalities,	it	is	still	static	and	can	become	the	
source	of	an	unequal	status	quo.
3.	 An	Alternative	Account	of	Institutions:	Deliberation	and	Inequality
3.1.	Deliberative	perspective
	 As	discussed	previously,	historical-sociological	 institutionalism	has	successfully	modified	the	rational-
choice	institutionalism’s	reductionist	assumption	about	individual	behavior	(i.e.,	 that	political	actors	always	
desire	to	maximize	self-interested	preferences	under	transaction-cost-reducing	rules),	extending	the	definition	
of	 institutions	 to	 include	historical	and	sociological	factors.	However,	 these	models	still	 lack	an	inherent	
mechanism	by	which	political	actors autonomously	 formulate	 their	will	 and	modify	 their	preferences	
independently	 from	historically	and	socially	constructed	structural	 frameworks.	Historical-sociological	
institutionalism	does	not	have	a	vehicle	to	spontaneously	deconstruct	existing	institutional	settings.
	 To	overcome	the	context-dependent	nature	of	historical-sociological	institutionalism	(and	also	the	static	and	
deterministic	nature	of	rational-choice	models),	it	seems	crucial	to	add	a	deliberative	element	as	an	alternative	
perspective	to	the	analysis	of	political	action	and	institutional	change	and	continuity.	The	deliberative	account	
of	 institutions	 is	better	able	 to	explain	 the	dynamics	of	political	action	and	institutional	change	(Schmidt	
2008)	that	can,	in	turn,	become	a	catalyst	for	the	deconstruction	of	an	unequal	status	quo.	Public	deliberation	
and	unconstrained	exchanges	of	political	views	and	preferences	 in	 the	public	realm	provides	actors	with	
opportunities	to	autonomously	consider	political	agendas	using	the	logic	of	reasoned	communication.	This	
offers	agents	an	interactive	and	educational	experience	that	allows	them	to	learn	about	existing	inequalities	in	
society	and	foster	 the	development	of	a	public-minded	consensus	rather	 than	self-interested	consumerist	
behavior.	 In	addition,	 institutions	play	a	complementary	 role	 in	 facilitating	and	promoting	deliberative	
consultations	and	well-considered	decision-making	by	providing	actors	with	more	detailed	information	and	
non-cost-benefit-perspectives.	Accordingly,	political	action	is	not	understood	as	the	result	of	actors’	rational	
calculation,	path-dependent	historical	legacies,	or	norm-appropriate	assessments	(Schmidt	2008).	Instead,	it	is	
the	process	in	which	political	actors	create	and	maintain	institutions	through	critical	and	rational	deliberation.	
In	this	sense,	institutions	exist	prior	to	political	agents’	actions,	dialogues,	and	discourses	and,	thus,	agents	are	
independent	and	autonomous	rather	than	subordinated	to	institutions	(i.e.,	rules).	This	understanding	allows	
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actors	 to	 spontaneously	 change	 the	 rules	 and	preferences	 using	 the	 logic	 of	 social	 legitimacy	 and	
appropriateness	rather	than	merely	passively	expecting	“happy”	changes	in	historical	developments	or	social	
norms.	Indeed,	it	is	important	to	ensure	that	political	outcomes	accurately	reflect	the	preferences	of	agents	and	
assume	“the	greatest	happiness	of	 the	greatest	number.”	However,	what	 is	more	important	 is	whether	 the	
actors’	preferences	are	thoroughly	deliberated	before the	calculation	of	preferences.	The	deliberative	account	
of	 institutionalism	provides	agents	with	opportunities	 to	modify	and	change	their	preferences,	or,	at	 least,	
come	into	contact	with	differing	views	and	ideas,	and	ultimately	formulate	an	intersubjective	understanding	of	
society.	This,	 in	turn,	can	act	as	a	catalyst	 to	deconstruct	 the	status	quo	formed	by	simple	aggregations	of	
preferences,	historical	legacies,	or	social	norms.
3.2.	Empirical	evidence
	 As	a	result	of	the	previous	discussions,	the	next	question	that	arises	is	how	does	deliberation	work	in	actual	
practice?	The	most	powerful	example	 is	Deliberative	Polling	 (DP),	a	 form	of	deliberative	opinion	poll	
inspired	by	theories	of	deliberative	democracy,	that	has	been	experimented	with	by	James	Fishkin	(2004).	The	
DP	process	 is	as	follows:	first,	 representative	deliberators	are	chosen	randomly	from	the	population.	The	
number	of	chosen	samples	is	usually	around	130	to	450	(Fishkin	and	Farrar	2005).	Sample	representatives	are	
polled	on	the	targeted	public	issue,	and	participants’	current	preferences	are	examined.	After	this	base-line	
poll,	participants	convene	in	a	single	 location	and	are	divided	into	small	groups.	After	distributing	well-
balanced	briefing	materials	 to	participants,	each	small	group	conducts	a	discussion	concerning	the	agenda	
with	a	trained	moderator.	The	moderator’s	role	is	to	make	the	session	interactive	and	facilitate	participants	
voicing	 their	views	 fairly	and	effectively.	Representative	deliberators	also	have	opportunities	 to	pose	
questions	to	politicians	and	experts	participating	in	the	deliberative	forum.	After	deliberations,	participants	are	
polled	again	and	their	preferences	are	re-checked.	The	results	of	the	polling	are	broadcast	on	television.
	 According	 to	Fishkin	 (2004),	 there	were	significant	changes	 in	participants’	views	before	and	after	
deliberations	 in	each	deliberative	setting.	For	example,	 in	 the	Australian	Deliberative	Polling	held	on	
February	16-18,	2001,	 in	which	“Aboriginal	Reconciliation”	was	 the	 targeted	 issue,	 the	percentage	of	
participants	who	considered	reconciliation	with	 indigenous	Australians	as	an	 important	 issue	 increased	
dramatically	from	31%	before	deliberations	to	60%	after	deliberations.	In	addition,	the	percentage	of	those	
who	acknowledged	that	disadvantages	still	remained	for	Aboriginal	people	rose	from	52%	to	80%	after	the	
democratic,	public	dialogues	(Fishkin	2004).	If	rational-choice	theories	are	applied	to	this	case,	 the	result	
before deliberations	can	be	regarded	as	“the	will	of	people”	(or	“the	will	of	all”).	However,	as	the	outcomes	of	
the	DP	demonstrate,	political	actors	change	their	preferences	or	political	views	if	they	have	an	opportunity	to	
inform	themselves	and	discuss	the	issue	in	a	deliberative	setting.	These	results	imply	that	deliberation	can	
play	an	important	role	 in	 increasing	awareness	about	disadvantages	and,	 in	 turn,	deconstruct	 the	unequal	
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status	quo	in	a	society.
Conclusion
	 Historical-sociological	 institutionalism	has	advantages	over	rational-choice	models	because	 the	former	
incorporates	the	possibility	of	contextual	changes	having	the	potential	to	break	the	status	quo.	However,	the	
historical-sociological	understanding	of	institutions	is	still	static	in	nature	and	lacks	an	inherent	mechanism	by	
which	agents	autonomously	formulate	their	will,	 reconsider	 their	preferences	independently	from	existing	
historical	or	sociological	frameworks,	and	rectify	existing	unequal	social	distributions.	This	paper	argues	that	
the	context-dependent	aspects	of	historical-sociological	institutionalism	and	the	static	and	deterministic	nature	
of	rational-choice	models	can	be	complemented	by	deliberative	exchanges	of	preferences	among	agents.	
These	exchanges	can	act	as	vehicles	to	deconstruct	an	existing	unequal	status	quo.	Such	a	deliberative	account	
of	institutionalism	can	be	supported	by	empirical	evidence	derived	from	the	Deliberative	Polling	project.	This	
paper’s	analysis	suggests	that	there	are	important	implications	for	understanding	structured	social	disparities	
and	new	institutionalist	approaches.
References
Cammack,	P.	(1992).	‘The	New	Institutionalism:	Predatory	Rule,	Institutional	Persistence,	and	Macro-Social	Change,’ 
Economy and Society,	21	(4),	pp.	398-429.
Campbell,	J.	(2004).	Institutional Change and Globalization.	Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press.
Collier,	R.,	and	Collier,	D.	(1991).	Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, The Labor Movement, and Regime 
Dynamics in Latin America.	Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press.
Elster,	 J.	 (1989).	 ‘Social	 Institutions,’	 in	Elster,	 J.	ed.	Nuts and Bolts for the Social Science.	New	York:	Cambridge	
University	Press.
Fishkin,	J.	(2004).	Deliberative Polling®: Toward a Better-Informed Democracy.	[Online]	Available	at:	http://cdd.stanford.
edu/polls/docs/summary/	[Accessed	on	April	25,	2011].
Fishkin,	J.,	and	Farrar,	C.	(2005).	Deliberative	Polling:	From	Experiment	to	Community	Resource.	In	Gastil,	J.	and	Levine,	
P.	ed.	(2005).	The Deliberative Democracy Handbook: Strategies for Effective Civic Engagement in the 21st Century,	San	
Francisco,	CA:	Jossey-Bass,	pp.68-79.
Granovetter,	M.	(1985).	‘Economic	Action	and	Social	Structure:	The	Problem	of	Embeddedness,’	American Journal of 
Sociology,	91	(3),	pp.481-510.
Green,	D.,	and	Shapiro,	I.	(1996).	Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory.	New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press.
Gutmann,	A.,	and	Thompson,	D.	(2004). Why Deliberative Democracy?	Princeton,	New	Jersey:	Princeton	University	Press.
Hall,	P.,	and	Taylor,	R.	(1996).	‘Political	Science	and	the	Three	New	Institutionalism,’	Political Studies,	44	(5),	pp.	936-957.
Hay,	C.,	and	Wincott,	D.	(1998).	‘Structure,	Agency	and	Historical	Institutionalism,’	Political Studies,	46	(5),	pp.	951-957.
Koelble,	T.	(1995).	‘The	New	Institutionalism	in	Political	Science	and	Sociology,’	Comparative Politics,	27	(2),	pp.	231-
国際公共政策研究  第17巻第 1 号132
243.
March,	J.,	and	Olsen,	J.	(1989).	Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics.	New	York:	The	Free	Press.
─ .	(1998).	‘The	Institutional	Dynamics	of	International	Political	Order,’	International Organization,	52	(4),	pp.	943-969.
North,	D.	(1981).	Structure and Change in Economic History.	New	York:	W.W.	Norton.
─ .	(1990).	Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance.	New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press.
Ostrom,	E.	(1990).	Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action.	New	York:	Cambridge	
University	Press.
─ .	(1998).	‘A	Behavioral	Approach	to	the	Rational	Choice	Theory	of	Collective	Action,’	American Political Science 
Review,	92	(1),	pp.1-22.
Peters,	G.	et	al.	(2005).	‘The	Politics	of	Path	Dependency:	Political	Conflict	in	Historical	Institutionalism,’	The Journal of 
Politics,	67	(4),	pp.	1275-1300.
Pierson,	P.	(2000).	‘Increasing	Returns,	Path	Dependence,	and	the	Study	of	Politics,’	American Political Science Review,	94	
(2),	pp.	251-267.
Powell,	W.,	and	DiMaggio,	P.	ed.	(1991).	The New Institutionalism in Organization Analysis.	Chicago:	The	University	of	
Chicago	Press.
Schmidt,	V.	(2008).	‘Discursive	Institutionalism:	The	Explanatory	Power	of	Ideas	and	Discourse,’	The Annual Review of 
Political Science,	11	(June),	pp.	303-326.
Sen,	A.	(1990).	‘Rational	Foods:	A	Critique	of	the	Behavioral	Foundations	of	Economic	Theory.’	In	Mansbridge,	J.	ed.	
(1990)	Beyond Self-Interest.	Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	pp.	25-43.
Shepsle,	K.	(1989).	‘Studying	Institutions:	Some	Lessons	from	the	Rational	Choice	Approach,’	Journal of Theoretical 
Politics,	1	(2),	pp.131-147.
Steinmo,	S.	et	al.	ed.	 (1992).	Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis.	New	York:	
Cambridge	University	Press.
